Not all intuitions are created equal or ""What is the thesis of this paper?"
Fortwith, an abstract from the "Experimental Epistemology Laboratory" at Indiana.
A growing body of empirical literature challenges philosophers’ reliance on intuitions as evidence based on the fact that intuitions vary according to factors such as cultural and educational background, and socio-economic status. Our research extends this challenge, investigating Lehrer’s appeal to the Truetemp Case as evidence against reliabilism. We found that intuitions in response to this case vary according to whether, and what, other thought experiments are considered first. Our results show that: 1) willingness to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp Case increases after being presented with a clear case of non-knowledge, and 2) willingness to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp Case decreases after being presented with a clear case of knowledge. We contend that this instability undermines the supposed evidential status of these intuitions. After considering several objections and replies, we conclude that our results strengthen the empirical case against intuitions, such that philosophers who deal in intuitions can no longer rest comfortably in their armchairs. (LINK)
Hmmm, did they say "clear cases". As in cases where even the subjects' intuitions are clear. Mmmhmmm.
I'll take non-sequiturs for $700 Alex:
"Some intuitions vary, thus intuitions aren't good evidence."
And as usual my enemy's enemy is *not* my friend because I do think that empirical research into the solidity of intuitions is a good idea (though I suppose an ideal agent could know a priori that this was an unclear intuition, the rest of us aren't so lucky).
In particular, I'd love to have some empirical research aimed at the "intuitions" typically claimed to be associated with the famed Bank Case and other cases pragmatic encroachers use to sully our pure epistemology. 0:-I
A growing body of empirical literature challenges philosophers’ reliance on intuitions as evidence based on the fact that intuitions vary according to factors such as cultural and educational background, and socio-economic status. Our research extends this challenge, investigating Lehrer’s appeal to the Truetemp Case as evidence against reliabilism. We found that intuitions in response to this case vary according to whether, and what, other thought experiments are considered first. Our results show that: 1) willingness to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp Case increases after being presented with a clear case of non-knowledge, and 2) willingness to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp Case decreases after being presented with a clear case of knowledge. We contend that this instability undermines the supposed evidential status of these intuitions. After considering several objections and replies, we conclude that our results strengthen the empirical case against intuitions, such that philosophers who deal in intuitions can no longer rest comfortably in their armchairs. (LINK)
Hmmm, did they say "clear cases". As in cases where even the subjects' intuitions are clear. Mmmhmmm.
I'll take non-sequiturs for $700 Alex:
"Some intuitions vary, thus intuitions aren't good evidence."
And as usual my enemy's enemy is *not* my friend because I do think that empirical research into the solidity of intuitions is a good idea (though I suppose an ideal agent could know a priori that this was an unclear intuition, the rest of us aren't so lucky).
In particular, I'd love to have some empirical research aimed at the "intuitions" typically claimed to be associated with the famed Bank Case and other cases pragmatic encroachers use to sully our pure epistemology. 0:-I
Labels: evidence, Intuition, naturalism, naturalized epistemology, pragmatic encroachment
posted by Trent_Dougherty at
4:51 PM
3 Comment(s):
Trent,
I'm not quite sure what your criticism is. You seem to suggest that the researchers are somehow inconsistent in their views concerning intuitions. (In your "Hmmm, did they say 'clear cases'" paragraph.) But I do not see why you think this. I suspect that by "clear cases of non-knowledge", the researchers mean cases in which their is a high willingness to deny knowledge regardless of the order in which the cases are presented. Similarly for "clear cases of knowledge".
Now the researchers' reasoning can be summed up as follows:
(1) Intuitions in certain cases (i.e., the Truetemp Case) vary dramatically in the following manner: attributions of knowledge increase when respondents are first presented with clear cases of non-knowledge and decrease when they are first presented with clear cases of knowledge.
(2) So, intuitions in those cases do not provide good evidence.
Regardless of whether this reasoning is any good, it seems to me that its conclusion is not at all inconsistent with calling some cases "clear cases of non-knowledge" and others "clear cases of knowledge" when those phrases are understood as suggested above.
I'm also not sure that your interpretation of the researchers' thesis is a charitable one. You seem to suggest that their conclusion is that intuitions are never good evidence. However, it seems to me that their conclusion is much weaker than that. It is that (i) intuitions that vary widely based on the order of cases considered are not good evidence and (ii) because of this, to determine whether an intuition provides good evidence empirical investigation is needed to determine whether it varies in that way, and this cannot be done from an armchair.
In conclusion, I think that your suggestion that the researchers are being inconsistent in their treatment of intuitions is mistaken and that your interpretation of their thesis is uncharitable and, probably, mistaken. Whether they are correct to draw the conclusions they do is a different matter.
By
Greg, at 10/04/2007 9:40 AM
Thanks Greg, my reading may well be uncharitable, it is certainly intended to be a bit of a rebuke for what I find sloppy language: I find people writing on this topic tend to write very much as if intuitions were essentially unreliable.
The charitable interpretation is in fact a view I share. However, I take great care to express the difference carefully (as you have) and it irks me that others don't take equal care. As Joshua recently said in a recent conversation concerning the Principle of Charity, it's *their* ___ing job to make themselves clear. :-)~
I'm very much concerned with issues pertaining to metaepistemology and the philosophy of language and happen to think it's been very bad for epistemology that people haven't worked hard enough to distinguish which intuitions count for how much. For that reason, I very much support the "Lab" and just yesterday was thinking that Bloomington would be a dream-job for me.
Still, they should be more careful in their wording, for *many* have misunderstood: I meet many who's adoption of the uncharitable interpretation is not--as it is in my case--due to a deficiency of charity. :-)~
By
Trent_Dougherty, at 10/04/2007 2:58 PM
I have saw a lot of this article in all the internet because many people like to read a lot, i wonder if how many words can this people read in a minute.
By
iserve pharmacy, at 10/20/2011 3:43 PM
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