A Dilemma for Deniers of a priori Intuition
In our Self-evidence reading group, Earl has several times expressed skepticism about there being a phenomenology associated with a priori intuition (what we'll call the mode of grasping a self-evident proposition). A couple of times he's seemed to indicate that, parallel to Hume's statement about the self, he just doesn't see anything when he looks inside for such things.
It could be that in the back of his mind is something like the following assumption.
(FA1) Necessarily, for every experience E, E's phenomenal character is constituted by at least one of the sensuous characters associated with the five sensory modalities and my nothing else.
I think (FA1) pretty clearly false though, so I'm not sure what Earl is thinking. I here offer a dilemma on behalf of such qualia.
Definitions
D1 Necessarily, for any experience E, E has phenomenal character just in case there's something it's like to have that experience.
D2. Necessarily, for any experience E, E's phenomenal character is what it feels like to host E.
D3. A phenomenal concept =df a concept one can have only by being in a certain experience.
Argument A
1. Either there's something it's like to grasp the validity of modus ponens.
2. If there is not something it's like to grasp the validity of modus ponens, then no one has ever known they've grasped modus ponens.
3. But some have known they've grasped modus ponens.
4. Thus, there's something it's like to grasp modus ponens.
In a forthcoming paper Rich and Earl say that one's evidence that one is frustrated can include "a palpable sense of your own frustration". Now "palpable" is ambiguous in just the way "felt" is. It can mean felt with the five senses or felt in some broader sense. I see no reason to think that one could not have evidence that one is frustrated apart from how one looks, smells, sounds, feels, or tastes to oneself (though one can have such evidence).
It could be that the ambiguity is there on purpose to put off discussion of phenomenology, but I think such cases depend on introspective phenomenology and so we've got a more general dilemma stemming from all the things we think we know that we wouldn't if introspective phenomenology didn't provide evidence.
It could be that in the back of his mind is something like the following assumption.
(FA1) Necessarily, for every experience E, E's phenomenal character is constituted by at least one of the sensuous characters associated with the five sensory modalities and my nothing else.
I think (FA1) pretty clearly false though, so I'm not sure what Earl is thinking. I here offer a dilemma on behalf of such qualia.
Definitions
D1 Necessarily, for any experience E, E has phenomenal character just in case there's something it's like to have that experience.
D2. Necessarily, for any experience E, E's phenomenal character is what it feels like to host E.
D3. A phenomenal concept =df a concept one can have only by being in a certain experience.
Argument A
1. Either there's something it's like to grasp the validity of modus ponens.
2. If there is not something it's like to grasp the validity of modus ponens, then no one has ever known they've grasped modus ponens.
3. But some have known they've grasped modus ponens.
4. Thus, there's something it's like to grasp modus ponens.
In a forthcoming paper Rich and Earl say that one's evidence that one is frustrated can include "a palpable sense of your own frustration". Now "palpable" is ambiguous in just the way "felt" is. It can mean felt with the five senses or felt in some broader sense. I see no reason to think that one could not have evidence that one is frustrated apart from how one looks, smells, sounds, feels, or tastes to oneself (though one can have such evidence).
It could be that the ambiguity is there on purpose to put off discussion of phenomenology, but I think such cases depend on introspective phenomenology and so we've got a more general dilemma stemming from all the things we think we know that we wouldn't if introspective phenomenology didn't provide evidence.
posted by Trent_Dougherty at
11:32 AM
2 Comment(s):
Jason,
1. My interp is that he denies the phenomenology. Otherwise, I don't know how to make sense of his statements that he doesn't find any when he introspects.
2. I agree that he seems to affirm it in other areas which puzzles me. I think I quoted from a forthcoming paper where he does.
At any rate, in a forthcoming paper they endorse something that sounds just like non-doxastic seemings, yet in a section called "non-doxastic seemeings" they say they don't. I'm really looking forward to seeing the resolution. Perhaps it's terminological or perhaps he interps the seeming not as phenomenological (which would be a wierd use of words) but as merely a "pull". This could be *conscious* without there being any sensuous qualia. Desires might be like this, so maybe some cognitive states are as well.
3. I hope your interp is correct. In part because it expresses the
Fortuneately, I think we can count on this mystery being solved in time.
By
Trent_Dougherty, at 11/03/2006 9:10 AM
Jason,
You read me aright, I think, in that I want to reserve "sensuous" for describing the phenomenal charachter associated with experiences produced by the five canonical senses.
My hypothesis is that the non-sensuous phenomenal charachter of a priori ituition is something that we and Earl are describing differently. Or that he just doesn't believe there is any such thing, or that he thinks phenomenal conservatives are claiming there is.
By
Trent_Dougherty, at 11/03/2006 1:35 PM
Post a Comment
<< Home